From Clientelism to Programmatic Politics: The Institutionalization of Political Parties in South Korea

Yeaji Kim[*]   John Kuk[†]

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Abstract

In many newer democracies, political parties often remain clientelistic and weakly institutionalized, making the transition to more programmatic and stable systems a rare phenomenon. South Korea, historically marked by fragile party-voter ties, lack of diverse political cleavages, conservative dominance, and weakly institutionalized parties, presents a unique case of political development. This study reframes institutionalization as a party-level process and focuses on the emergence of programmatic institutionalization—a shift toward ideological coherence and strategic voter targeting. Using text analysis of National Assembly election manifestos from 1992 to 2016 and survey data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), we show that South Korean parties have gradually adapted their left-right positions and aligned their platforms with the ideological preferences of their core supporters. These patterns of ideological adaptation and targeted appeals reveal a growing coherence in party-voter linkages. By centering on party-level transformation rather than system-wide consolidation, this study challenges assumptions about institutional stagnation in new democracies and illustrates how programmatic development can emerge even in contexts long considered resistant to such change.

Keywords: Programmatic Institutionalization, Political Parties, New Democracies, South Korea, Ideological Adaptation, Party Development, Party System Evolution, Manifesto Analysis
Word Count:

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[*]Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, California State University Dominguez Hills, yekim@csudh.edu
[†]Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Michigan State University, jskuk@msu.edu

1 Introduction

In representative democracies, political parties serve as the primary vehicles for structuring political competition, articulating voter preferences, and translating them into policy. Through elections and legislative behavior, they link citizens to the state and give democratic governance coherence and accountability (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006; Randall and Svåsand 2002b). Yet, while this ideal casts parties as responsive and programmatic actors, a persistent critique in both scholarly and public discourse is that many political parties—especially in newer democracies— fail to deliver on these functions. Rather than engaging voters through clear and consistent policy platforms, parties in these contexts are often portrayed as clientelistic, electorally volatile, and weakly institutionalized (Kitschelt et al. 2010; Luna 2014).

This view, however, may overlook the potential for transformation. Political parties, even in newer democracies, are not static. They operate within changing social, economic, and institutional environments and face strategic pressures to adapt. While scholars have long debated the degree to which parties shift their ideological positions (Adams et al. 2004, 2006; Adams and Ezrow 2009; Green 2011; Meguid 2005, 2008; Tavits 2007; Ezrow et al. 2011), recent work has begun to ask a deeper question: Can we expect parties in newer democracies to become more programmatic and well institutionalized—like the parties in advanced democracies of Western Europe—or will they remain perpetually underdeveloped? This question is central to ongoing debates about democratic consolidation and representative quality.

This study takes up that challenge by focusing on South Korea, a country that transitioned to democracy in 1987 and has since maintained regular elections and peaceful transfers of power. Despite these institutional achievements, South Korea's party system has long been marked by elite volatility, lack of diverse cleavages, and limited connections to social bases (Cho and Kruszewska 2018; Han 2020; Hellmann 2014; Kim 2024). Against this backdrop, we examine whether South Korean parties have exhibited signs of programmatic institutionalization over time, specifically by analyzing changes in their ideological positions and patterns of voter targeting.

Using an original dataset of 25 party manifestos from seven National Assembly elections

(1992–2016), along with voter-level data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), this study tracks how parties adapt their left-right positions and identifies the types of voters they prioritize in these adjustments. Although parties vary in the extent of programmatic development, we find strong evidence of ideological adaptation and increasing coherence, especially among those that target core supporters who are both ideologically proximate and resource-rich. These findings suggest that even in the absence of strong linkage with voters—and despite factors such as elite volatility, weak cleavages, and institutional instability—strategic incentives can push parties toward more programmatic behavior.

This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it shifts the focus from party system institutionalization to party-level institutionalization—especially the dimension of programmatic institutionalization—as a way to better understand democratic development in newer democracies. Second, it advances the study of party-voter linkages by unpacking how and for whom parties adjust their platforms, moving beyond simplistic models of uniform responsiveness. Third, it introduces the South Korean case into a comparative conversation about party development, challenging the assumption that newer democracies are locked into patterns of clientelism or ideological incoherence. Finally, by utilizing manifesto data and voter surveys, this research provides a richer empirical basis for analyzing how parties navigate the dual pressures of voter alignment and electoral competition over time.

This perspective contributes to a broader reevaluation of democratic quality in newer democracies. If political parties can adapt programmatically in environments marked by elite dominance and weak social cleavages, it suggests that institutionalization is not merely a product of historical legacies or structural endowments but also of strategic behavior and political learning. Moreover, by centering the analysis on the party level rather than the party system as a whole, this study highlights the importance of intra-party dynamics and partisan strategies in shaping patterns of responsiveness and representation.

2 Party Development in New Democracies

Party institutionalization has emerged as a central lens for evaluating the development of political parties in democratic systems. Institutionalized parties exhibit stable patterns of electoral competition, strong linkages with voters, and coherent internal organizations, contributing to the long-term viability of representative democracy (Diamond et al. 1989; Huntington 1968; Mainwaring 1999; Morlino 1998; Tavits 2005). While parties in established democracies often display these features, parties in newer democracies are frequently described as weak, clientelistic, and unstable (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006; Levitsky 2003). A key question in the party politics literature is whether parties in new democracies can develop in ways that resemble those in advanced democratic systems, or whether they remain structurally and behaviorally underdeveloped.

Scholars define and study party institutionalization in multiple ways, reflecting the concept's long-standing and multifaceted nature. Traditionally, it has been approached through two primary lenses: the institutionalization of the party system as a whole and the institutionalization of individual political parties as organizations. One strand of the literature, often labeled party system institutionalization (PSI), focuses on the overall stability and predictability of inter-party competition. As conceptualized by (Mainwaring and Scully 1995), PSI is commonly measured using indicators, such as electoral volatility, the effective number of parties, patterns of party continuity, and programmatic stability. The other strand, centered on party-level institutionalization (PI), emphasizes the internal development of individual parties—leadership continuity, formalized structures and decision-making processes, elite professionalization, and resource consolidation—a process often referred to as party routinization (Panebianco 1988; Levitsky 2003). Panebianco (1988) further introduces the concept of value infusion, referring to members' emotional attachment and loyalty as signs of organizational depth. Recent work builds on this foundation by treating institutionalization explicitly as a party-level phenomenon, with routinization and value infusion as core dimensions of internal party development (Ponce and Scarrow 2023; Scarrow et al. 2022).

Much of the literature on party development in newer democracies has emphasized the difficulty of achieving any of these key dimensions of party institutionalization. Studies of Latin

America, Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia point to recurring patterns of weak party organizations, elite-driven personalization, and high electoral volatility (Roberts 2014; Randall and Svåsand 2002a; Hicken and Kuhonta 2015). Even when parties endure across multiple election cycles, they often fail to develop stable ideological profiles or to adapt their platforms in ways that consistently respond to voter preferences, undermining programmatic development (Tavits 2013; Lupu 2016). Rather than functioning as durable intermediaries between citizens and the state, parties in these contexts are often characterized by short-lived coalitions, clientelistic practices, and opportunistic policy shifts. Many also lack stable or cohesive relationships with their own members, as they adopt catch-all strategies that prioritize broad electoral appeal over organizational depth or ideological consistency. These patterns pose challenges to programmatic institutionalization—defined as the development of stable, coherent ideological profiles, and consistent policy commitments over time (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Tavits 2007; Luna 2014). However, as (Ponce and Scarrow 2023) argue, even under such constraints, institutionalization can emerge through different configurations, with parties selectively developing some dimensions—such as routinized behavior or value-laden appeals—that influence how they engage and mobilize supporters.

A major obstacle to party or party system institutionalization in many transitional democracies is clientelism, defined in the party context as the strategic use of targeted, contingent material exchanges by political parties to mobilize electoral support. Rather than appealing to broad policy platforms or ideological commitments, clientelistic parties deliver jobs, goods, or services in exchange for votes, often prioritizing short-term loyalty over long-term policy alignment. This practice undermines parties' programmatic development in newer democracies by discouraging voters from forming stable, issue-based preferences and by incentivizing parties to invest in distributive networks rather than ideological clarity (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes 2007). In clientelistic systems, personalistic leadership and blurred ideological boundaries weaken voter-party linkages, making it difficult for electorates to distinguish among competing platforms. As a result, party competition becomes transactional and unpredictable, undermining both policy responsiveness and democratic accountability (Keefer 2007; Hagopian et al. 2009).

Although party institutionalization has been widely studied, the existing literature remains constrained by several important limitations. First, a major conceptual issue concerns the ambiguous relationship between party-level and party system institutionalization. As Bértoa et al. (2024) point out, there is persistent fuzziness in how scholars define and distinguish between these two levels—particularly regarding whether party system institutionalization is a prerequisite for (Tavits 2008) or a consequence of party-level institutionalization (Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Toole 2000)—leading to both conceptual and empirical confusion. While PSI is typically measured using system-wide attributes like electoral volatility, the number of effective parties, and programmatic stability, these outcomes often hinge on the developmental trajectories of individual parties. Without sufficiently examining the underlying party behaviors that produce these patterns, it is difficult to assess the true level of PSI. Even when party systems exhibit a degree of continuity, individual parties may remain ideologically incoherent, relying instead on personalistic appeals or catch-all strategies that undermine long-term institutional development. This distinction is crucial for understanding institutionalization in newer democracies, where surface-level system stability may mask deeper organizational weaknesses at the party level. In other words, it remains unclear whether PSI should be seen as a prerequisite for or a product of PI. Yet it is at the party level that strategic decisions, ideological adaptations, and organizational efforts occur—suggesting that individual parties may drive institutionalization before system-level equilibrium is achieved (Bértoa et al. 2024; Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Toole 2000; Scarrow et al. 2022).

Second, despite its analytical importance, programmatic institutionalization has received far less attention in the study of newer democracies. While scholars have extensively examined organizational development, electoral volatility, and the persistence of clientelism in transitional systems, fewer studies have focused on how parties in these contexts build consistent policy identities or structure competition around ideas. Much of the foundational research on programmatic differentiation—such as work on party repositioning, issue-based appeals, and ideological signaling—has centered on advanced democracies, particularly in Western Europe and the United States (Adams et al. 2004, 2006; Adams and Ezrow 2009; Green 2011; Meguid 2005, 2008; Tavits

2007; Ezrow et al. 2011). In contrast, parties in newer democracies are often assumed to rely primarily on clientelism or personalism, leaving little room to explore how they might engage in strategic, issue-based competition. Yet, as Luna (2014) and Roberts (2014) have shown, even in contexts with weak organizational development, some parties demonstrate surprising programmatic coherence. Understanding these dynamics is critical for explaining how newer party systems may gradually consolidate through issue-based competition.

Relatedly, research on party responsiveness has rarely been integrated into institutionalization frameworks—particularly in transitional democracies. Most studies treat responsiveness to voter preferences as separate from party institutionalization, focusing on short-term adaptations rather than long-term consistency. However, programmatic institutionalization is not about rigidity; it involves a form of adaptive consistency where parties shift their policy positions over time while retaining a stable ideological core. This kind of responsiveness can strengthen voter-party linkages and reinforce credibility, both of which are critical to institutionalization.

Lastly, existing research has paid insufficient attention to how parties in newer democracies respond to the composition and behavior of their electorates. While many studies focus on elite-driven strategies or organizational development, they often overlook the ways in which voter characteristics shape party behavior. This omission is important because voters are not merely passive recipients of party appeals; they actively interpret, evaluate, and disseminate party messages. Parties, in turn, make strategic decisions about whom to target based on expectations about which segments of the electorate are most likely to participate, influence others, and respond to programmatic signals. Recent research shows that parties often prioritize core supporters—particularly those seen as politically active or influential—in campaign activities such as rallies and demonstrations (Brierley and Kramon 2020; Rauschenbach 2015). In a similar vein, Ponce and Scarrow (2023) highlight that the type of party institutionalization influences mobilization strategies: routinized parties tend to activate committed partisans, while those emphasizing value infusion engage broader, less affiliated groups. Within this strategic calculus, parties often focus on segments of their base that are not only loyal but also resource-rich and politically engaged—such as better

educated, wealthier, or older voters—because these individuals are more likely to absorb program-
matic content and influence others. Yet, few studies systematically examine how parties craft their
platforms with these constituencies in mind or how these dynamics contribute to the development
of consistent ideological profiles over time. A more voter-centered approach to programmatic
institutionalization would help illuminate how party strategies evolve in response to electoral in-
centives, especially in newer democracies where voter engagement and party credibility are still
being built.

3   Programmatic Institutionalization in Newer Democracies

Party institutionalization has traditionally encompassed both party system-level stability and
party-level organizational development; nonetheless, the relationship between these two dimen-
sions remains conceptually ambiguous. This study argues that rather than treating system-level
attributes, such as electoral volatility or programmatic stability as starting points, we should focus
more directly on the efforts and behaviors of individual parties, assuming that PSI is the outcome of
PS. Institutionalization should be understood not as a binary or static outcome, but as an evolving
process shaped by strategic party actions. Party-level behaviors—such as ideological adaptation,
platform development, and strategic voter targeting—are foundational to institutionalization, es-
pecially in newer democracies where long-term systemic or organizational consolidation may be
lacking. Reframing institutionalization in this way helps clarify how parties cultivate credibility,
structure competition, and build durable political linkages under challenging democratic condi-
tions.

One critical—but often understudied—dimension of party institutionalization is programmatic
institutionalization, which focuses on how parties structure competition through ideas, policies,
and ideological commitments. Programmatic institutionalization refers to the extent to which
political parties rely on coherent platforms and issue-based appeals, rather than on personalistic
leadership or material inducements, to compete for electoral support (Kitschelt 1999; Luna and
Rovira Kaltwasser 2014). In systems where this form of institutionalization is strong, parties
present voters with consistent and meaningful policy choices and cultivate enduring relationships

rooted in substantive issues. Distinct from—but complementary to—organizational and system-level stability, programmatic institutionalization captures how parties build credibility, policy responsiveness, and ideological clarity over time. By foregrounding this dimension, this paper treats programmatic structuring not as a byproduct of broader institutional consolidation, but as a potentially foundational mechanism of party development in newer democracies.

This dimension is particularly relevant in newer democracies, where organizational and systemic forms of institutionalization often remain fragile or underdeveloped. Building strong party organizations—marked by internal rules, elite professionalization, routinized decision-making, and supportive legal or regulatory frameworks—typically requires prolonged democratic experience, repeated electoral cycles, and stable access to state or social resources (Panebianco 1988; Randall and Svåsand 2002a). Likewise, party system institutionalization—reflected in low electoral volatility, enduring party brands, and predictable competition—tends to be the result of long-term equilibrium among parties. These conditions have historically been present in cases, such as long-standing party traditions in Western Europe, mass-based party roots in early postwar Latin America, or sustained organizational development in countries like Germany or Sweden. However, many newer democracies lack such historical continuity or structural foundations, making it difficult to achieve the organizational or systemic dimensions of institutionalization early on. In these contexts, programmatic institutionalization—through ideological differentiation and issue-based appeals—may represent a more feasible and observable pathway for parties seeking to stabilize their electoral presence and strengthen voter linkages.

Despite these constraints, programmatic structuring may represent an early and alternative pathway to institutionalization. Parties may begin to differentiate themselves ideologically and develop voter linkages through policy appeals even in the absence of consolidated organizations or stable systems. In other words, programmatic institutionalization may not follow, but instead precede and enable other forms of institutionalization. As parties respond to voter demands, define their ideological space, and adopt consistent positions over time, they can reinforce partisan identities and help stabilize electoral dynamics—contributing to broader processes of democratic

consolidation (Mainwaring 2016; Roberts 2013). Programmatic institutionalization does not re-quire ideological rigidity; rather, it entails a pattern of adaptive consistency, in which parties adjust their stances over time while maintaining identifiable ideological orientations. This type of re-sponsiveness, especially when grounded in issue-based appeals, reflects not volatility but strategic coherence (Adams et al. 2004; Ezrow et al. 2011).

Under what conditions does programmatic institutionalization emerge in newer democracies? While multiple factors may shape this process, this study identifies four conditions that help ex-plain when and how parties adopt programmatic strategies in newer democracies. A first condition is the electoral incentives of political parties. In competitive and pluralistic electoral environments, parties have strategic reasons to distinguish themselves through programmatic appeals. Where ide-ological ambiguity risks losing voter trust or enables challenger parties to mobilize disaffected con-stituencies, parties face pressure to develop and maintain recognizable policy platforms (Adams et al. 2004; Kitschelt 2000). This logic applies particularly in newer democracies, where program-matic differentiation may help parties establish reputations and survive in fluid electoral contexts over time.

A second condition concerns parties' strategic assessments of their support base—specifically, who is most likely to participate, influence others, and offer valuable political resources. In newer democracies, parties may tailor their programmatic appeals to these groups to enhance their elec-toral survival. This support base includes not only ordinary voters but also core supporters, party activists, and politically engaged intermediaries who help amplify party messages and mobilize others. Resource-rich, politically aware, and civically engaged individuals—often those with higher education and income—are more likely to evaluate parties based on ideological consistency or policy specificity rather than material patronage (Luna 2014; Lupu and Stokes 2009). These actors are also more likely to read party policy documents, manifestos, or campaign materials, making them a disproportionately attentive audience for programmatic appeals. As such, parties may tailor their platforms to appeal to this subset of the public, not only because these supporters value issue alignment but also because they actively engage with and assess the content of party

messages. When a substantial portion of the electorate and support network is policy-oriented and attentive, parties are more likely to compete by refining their issue positions and offering credible platforms.

Third, parties' programmatic development does not necessarily depend on fully institutionalized organizations. Even when internal structures are weak or informal, parties may still articulate consistent policy positions and revise them over time in response to electoral incentives. While organizational institutionalization often develops gradually, parties with even minimal capacity to respond to public demands, define ideological stances, manage internal disagreement, and communicate coherent messages can engage in meaningful programmatic competition. This is often demonstrated by shifts in parties' left–right positions in manifestos, which signal responsiveness to changing voter preferences and efforts to refine their policy identities. Such adaptations reflect attempts to build policy-based credibility in the absence of full organizational maturity. Although not essential in the early stages, more institutionalized organizational features—such as routinized leadership succession, formalized decision-making procedures, internal coherence, and concrete financial resources from party members—can eventually strengthen a party's ability to maintain ideological consistency over time.

Fourth, even in the absence of historically rooted cleavages, newer democracies may develop new issue-based divides—such as nationalism, inequality, regionalism, or generational identity—that parties can use to anchor programmatic appeals. When parties succeed in linking their platforms to these emerging divides and reinforce them across multiple electoral cycles, they may begin to develop stable programmatic identities and cultivate loyal constituencies. In these contexts, shifts in left–right positioning do not necessarily indicate volatility, but may instead reflect ideological refinement in response to new political realities (Roberts 2014; Hicken and Kuhonta 2015).

To assess the degree of programmatic institutionalization in newer democracies, this study focuses on two core components: ideological adaptation with coherence and core supporter targeting. First, programmatic institutionalization requires that parties respond to changing political

environments by adapting their left–right positions over time, while still retaining an identifiable ideological orientation. This combination of responsiveness and coherence distinguishes programmatic adaptation from opportunistic or erratic shifts in platform. In contrast to parties that change positions in an ad hoc or purely reactive manner, programmatically institutionalized parties exhibit a pattern of strategic and ideologically grounded adjustment—they may recalibrate their stances on specific issues, but these changes occur within a consistent ideological framework. This allows voters to recognize a party's broader orientation even as it updates its policy priorities. Such adaptation reflects the idea of "dynamic representation," where parties respond to the evolving preferences of electorates without abandoning their programmatic identity (Adams et al. 2004; Ezrow et al. 2011). In newer democracies, this ability to shift while signaling stability is especially important, as it helps parties establish credibility, differentiate themselves from competitors, and build trust with ideologically attentive constituencies.

Second, programmatic institutionalization also involves the formation of stable linkages with specific segments of the electorate—particularly those whose policy preferences and political engagement align with the party's long-term strategic goals. Rather than appealing to undifferentiated mass electorates in a catch-all fashion, programmatically institutionalized parties craft their platforms to reflect the interests of core supporters in two key ways. On one hand, parties are more responsive to the policy preferences of voters who are already ideologically proximate. By aligning with these constituents, parties can reinforce partisan loyalty and maintain a coherent ideological identity over time. In addition, parties prioritize voters who possess higher levels of political resources—those who are better educated, wealthier, older, and more civically engaged—because these individuals are more likely to turn out, follow policy debates, influence others, and interpret signals embedded in party communications. These readers of manifestos and policy documents form a disproportionately attentive audience for programmatic appeals. As a result, parties have strong incentives to develop clear, issue-based platforms that speak directly to this group. In doing so, they not only solidify their base but also enhance the consistency, credibility, and reach of their ideological messaging. To summarize, three hypotheses have been posited thus far:

1) Ideological Adaptation Hypothesis (H1): Political parties in newer democracies will adjust their left–right policy positions over time in response to changing political environments.

2) Targeting Core Supporter Hypothesis (H2): Political parties in newer democracies are more likely to emphasize the preferences of voters who are ideologically aligned with them in their policy platforms than those who are not.

3) Targeting Supporters with Resources Hypothesis (H3): Political parties in newer democracies will exhibit greater policy responsiveness to voters who are both ideologically aligned and resource-rich (e.g., more educated, wealthier, politically engaged) than to less engaged or less aligned segments of the electorate.

4 South Korea as a Case Study

South Korea (hereafter, Korea) presents a compelling case to examine the dynamics of party development in newer democracies, particularly in the context of programmatic institutionalization. Since a democratic transition in 1987, Korea has gradually developed its democracy across many aspects, such as a mature civic culture, free, fair, and competitive elections, peaceful power successions, and active political participation. However, the country's party system has failed to match this level of democratic development. Many scholars have argued that the party system in Korea is weakly institutionalized (Han 2020; Lee and Singer 2022; Wang 2012; Wong 2014). Unlike Western Europe and the United States—where parties are known for long-standing reputations, stable partisan identities, and strong ties to social groups—parties in Korea are characterized by fragile linkages with voters and high electoral volatility (Croissant and Völkel 2012; Hellmann 2014). The disconnect between Korea's broader democratic progress and its weakly institutionalized party system makes it a valuable case for understanding whether and how political parties in newer democracies remain underdeveloped or gradually evolve by shifting their ideological orientations and building stronger relationships with their supporters.

Korean political parties and the party system are marked by several distinctive features that many scholars pointed out as the characteristics of parties and party systems in newer and transi-

tional democracies: a dominant two-party structure, frequent party mergers and splits, the absence of diverse political cleavages, a narrow ideological spectrum with a strong conservative orientation, and weak ties to social groups in society. Although Korea's party system is categorized into three distinct party families: progressive, liberal, and conservative families, it has long been dominated by two major parties: the liberal Democratic Party (DP) and the conservative People Power Party (PPP). These two parties have preserved their dominance from 1988 to the present through repeated mergers and name changes.[1] In 2004, Korea adopted a mixed electoral system—combining single-member districts and proportional representation—that opened opportunities for third-party alternatives. Nevertheless, these newer parties remain marginal due to institutional constraints, particularly the Political Funds Act, which mandates that parties must have at least 20 seats affiliated with the same party to form a negotiating group eligible for state subsidies (Kim 2024). Therefore, the Korean party system continues to operate as a de facto two-party system.

Korea's party system is also defined by frequent reorganizations and high electoral volatility, which further weaken ideological consistency. Parties often undergo cycles of splits and mergers, not as a result of major policy disagreements, but due to internal factional conflicts, failures to secure candidate nominations, or efforts to escape scandals. As Kwak (2021, p. 16) notes, Korean parties are characterized by the "splits and mergers of the politicians", with party names and formal identities changing, while core personnel and informal networks remain intact. These organizational shifts provide opportunities for sidelined elites to regain political standing, establish new leadership, or distance themselves from negative reputations. However, previous studies argue that they rarely introduce substantive ideological shifts (Hellmann 2014). For this reason, voters often regard newly formed parties with skepticism, recognizing the continuity of leadership and ideology behind the façade of change. This dynamic undermines ideological coherence and programmatic signaling, as parties fail to offer stable policy positions or long-term appeals to voters.

The lack of stable political cleavages that might structure ideological competition and foster long-term partisan attachments has been one of major obstacles to programmatic institutionaliza-

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[1]For details on two parties' historical transitions, see Kim (2024).

tion in Korea. Unlike established democracies where cleavages along class, religion, or urban–rural lines gave rise to differentiated party systems (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), Korea's post-transition party system has been shaped by elite collusion and geographic loyalties (Kang 2008; Wong 2014). Parties were initially formed by a small number of influential elites who built electoral coalitions around regional identities rather than policy-based platforms (Kang and Bae 2018; Moon 2005). From 1987 to 2002, Korean politics was dominated by the so-called "Three Kims"—Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung, and Kim Jong-pil—three influential political leaders, each associated with a different political party and regional base.[2] These figures relied heavily on regional appeals, which substituted for clear programmatic agendas. Although the retirement of the Three Kims marked the end of explicitly personalistic politics, regionalism has remained a dominant force (Han 2020; Kim 2024). Successor parties continue to rely on regional loyalties, and voters often choose candidates based on regional identity rather than ideological congruence. This enduring pattern undermines the formation of programmatic linkages between parties and voters, as geographic affiliation often overrides substantive policy differences (Cho and Kruszewska 2018).

Together with the lack of cleavage-based competition, the dominance of two major parties has reinforced a constrained ideological landscape, limiting the development of programmatic alternatives. Despite the nominal ideological differences between the DP and PPP, both parties have historically skewed toward conservative positions, and the overall party system reflects what Choi (2002) calls Korea a "conservative democracy." This conservative dominance stems from historical legacies: the Cold War, the Korean War, and decades of anticommunist authoritarian rule. Political movements advocating for labor rights or redistributive policies were often stigmatized as communist threats and suppressed accordingly (Choi 2002; Mobrand 2018). This climate marginalized class-based political cleavages and discouraged the development of progressive parties. Even the party that led the pro-democracy opposition before 1987, which has alternated between ruling and opposition status in the post-authoritarian era, has largely embraced conservative positions over time. Its ideological identity is rooted less in clear policy agendas and more in its historic op-

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[2]Kim Young-sam represented Yeongnam in the east, Kim Dae-jung represented Honam in the southwest, and Kim Jong-pil represented Chungcheong in the central-west.

position to the former military regime (Kang 2008). Consequently, the dominant parties tend to converge on conservative positions, and ideological differentiation remains shallow.

Another factor limiting programmatic institutionalization in Korea is the absence of strong, institutionalized ties between political parties and social groups. The major parties have not cultivated lasting relationships with organized interests, such as labor unions, civil society organizations, or representative groups for farmers, women, senior, youth, or small business owners. Their internal structures typically lack formal sub-organizations or affiliated branches that represent these constituencies, unlike many established democracies where such linkages are built into party statutes[3] This weak social embeddedness reflects both strategic priorities and historical legacies. During the authoritarian period, organized labor was excluded from policy-making and often suppressed as a threat to national security (Buchanan and Nicholls 2003, p. 233). Though progressive parties advocating labor rights emerged following the introduction of proportional representation in 2004, their influence has remained limited. The dominant parties continue to focus on regional electoral bases and elite alliances, rather than building sustained programmatic appeals to social constituencies. As Croissant and Völkel (2012, p. 256) observe, state corporatist frameworks failed to contain the rise of unauthorized unions, but no partisan channel emerged to incorporate them meaningfully. Thus, party manifestos rarely reflect the demands of specific social groups, and voters tend to support parties based on regional and personalistic loyalties rather than ideological congruence.

The South Korean case illustrates how newer democracies can institutionalize democratic procedures while continuing to struggle with party institutionalization. Despite electoral reforms and democratic consolidation in many areas, Korea's party system remains characterized by high electoral volatility driven by elite splits and mergers, persistent regionalism, and limited ideological differentiation. Both major parties have tended to converge on conservative positions and have not developed strong, lasting ties with labor, civil society, or other organized social groups. These conditions are not unique to Korea; they reflect broader challenges faced by many newer democ-

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[3]This information is collected from the Political Party Database (PPDB) project Round 1 and Round 2 data sets. For more information, see www.politicalpartydb.org.

racies, where parties often prioritize electoral survival and elite coordination over long-term organizational development and social representation. This context makes Korea a valuable case for examining whether and how parties in such settings can move beyond these constraints to achieve programmatic institutionalization over time.

5 Data and Methods

This study employs a two-part research design to evaluate the programmatic institutionalization of political parties in South Korea. First, we conduct a text analysis of 25 party manifestos from seven National Assembly elections (1992–2016) to examine whether parties have shifted their ideological positions over time (Ideological Adaptation Hypothesis: H1). Second, we analyze whether these shifts are strategically aligned with the preferences of core supporters and resource-endowed supporters, using individual-level survey data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) (Targeting Core Supporter Hypothesis: H2; Targeting Supporters with Resources Hypothesis: H3). The manifestos analyzed in the first stage are sourced from the Korean National Election Commission (NEC), the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) websites, and the National Assembly Library of Korea. Using original, raw manifesto documents offers a distinct advantage: it allows for direct examination of party strategies across elections without the distortions of manual coding. This study is among the first to systematically and quantitatively analyze Korean political parties' policy positions using these original texts.[4]

To establish the left-right positions of political parties along a scale, we employ the text analysis method known as Wordfish.[5] This technique treats words as observations, employing a Poisson distribution to represent the likelihood of encountering a certain number of unique words in a party's election manifesto. It involves comparing the relative usage of words in each manifesto while treating ideology as a latent variable (Proksch and Slapin 2009). The Wordfish model estimates four parameters: "document (party) positions, document (party) fixed effects, word weights

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[4]Although the CMP data provide Korea's political parties' left-right positions from 1992 to 2020 and have been used in prior work (e.g., Han (2020)), they have not yet been incorporated into statistical models or applied to analyze the dynamics of programmatic institutionalization over time.

[5]For more comprehensive information, refer to www.wordfish.org.

(discriminating parameters), and word fixed effects" (Proksch et al. 2011, p. 6). Eventually, the Wordfish method yields a single dimension with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. This dimension scales the relative word frequencies found in policy platforms.[6] Additionally, we pre-process the text documents by eliminating stop words, punctuation, numerals, and spaces; words with an overall frequency of less than 0.025% are removed.[7] Given that the manifesto data employed in this study are written in Korean, we also undertake a morphological analysis and noun extraction (stemming) using an R package named KoNLP.[8] This step is essential for accurately processing the Korean language text.

Compared to manual coding approaches such as those used in the CMP dataset, Wordfish offers several methodological advantages. In comparison to the widely utilized Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) data in the realm of party politics literature, the Wordfish approach holds distinct advantages for the study of party manifestos.[9] The Wordfish method facilitates a straightforward examination of the positioning of every word within party platforms, yielding more reliable ideology scales. Moreover, Wordfish eliminates the need for researchers to predetermine the ideology dimension using specified reference policies (Proksch and Slapin 2009). By offering an automated analytical procedure, it helps researchers avoid measurement errors stemming from human coding (Reinhardt and Victor 2012).[10]

As the second phase of our analysis, we employ both the extracted policy positions of political parties and the integrated module survey dataset from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) spanning the years 2000 to 2012, with a 4-year interval. This dataset is utilized to investigate which type of voters, specifically supporters, political parties are more inclined to

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[6]For a more detailed understanding, see Proksch and Slapin (2009) and Proksch et al. (2011)

[7]We have also conducted comparisons with various frequency thresholds, yielding consistent results that are available upon request.

[8]For detailed information, refer to https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/KoNLP/index.html.

[9]The CMP data involves manual coding by individual coders to identify quasi-sentences within a party's policy platform. Within the CMP framework, one quasi-sentence serves as the unit of analysis. Coders calculate the relative frequencies of quasi-sentences and then categorize them manually into one of 56 predefined categories spanning seven major policy areas. For detailed information, refer to https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/information/documents/handbooks.

[10]One limitation of the CMP data is that coders might assign the same quasi-sentence to different policy preference categories (Proksch et al. 2011), potentially introducing subjective interpretations.

target within their manifestos (H2 and H3). The CSES dataset encompasses a diverse range of information regarding individual-level attributes, encompassing 4,600 respondents. The survey data includes citizens' evaluations of democratic institutions, levels of political awareness, and preferences for various policies. In this study, we specify an ordinary least squares (OLS) model to test both the Targeting Core Supporter Hypothesis (H2) and the Targeting Supporters with Resource Hypothesis (H3). For reasons of parsimony, we initiate this phase with a basic model specification:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\textit{Ideological Difference}_i = &\beta_1 + \beta_2 \textit{ Dislike-like Score}_i + \beta_3 \textit{ Educational Attainment}_i \\
&+ \beta_4 \textit{ Age}_i + \beta_5 \textit{ Protestant}_i + \beta_6 \textit{ Female}_i + \beta_7 \textit{ Income}_i
\end{aligned}
\tag{1}
$$

To demonstrate whether political parties tailor their manifesto positions toward core supporters and those with resources, this study leverages parties' left-right positions based on Wordfish-estimated positions and CSES respondents' party affiliations. The main purpose is to investigate the alignment of parties' positions on the left-right spectrum within their manifestos with their supporters' perspectives. To this end, we establish a dependent variable labeled the *Ideological Difference between Parties and Supporters*, quantifying the ideological divergence between political parties and their supporters.[11] We standardize parties' ideological orientations—derived through text analysis of policy platforms—within a range from 0 (indicating the most liberal) to 10 (indicating the most conservative). This standardization aligns with individuals' self-identified political ideology scores present in the CSES data. Subsequently, we cross-reference respondents' party affiliations and examine the ideological gap between each respondent and the party they endorse to calculate the ideological difference between parties and their supporters. For example, consider a respondent who indicated support for the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) in the 2000 CSES survey and provided an ideology score of 7 on the 0 to 10 scale. In this scenario, we calculate the difference between this individual's self-identified ideology score from the CSES data and the MDP's ideology score derived from the text analysis of manifestos. If the MDP's ideology score

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[11]A comparison between party ideology positions extracted via the Wordfish method and those derived from the CMP data has been conducted. The analysis reveals a noteworthy positive correlation between positions from the CMP data and those generated by the Wordfish method (r=0.79).

is, for instance, 8, the discrepancy between the respondent and the party would be 1. The smaller this ideological disparity between the supporter and the party (i.e. closer to 0), the more likely it is that the party's manifesto is tailored to that specific individual. In contrast, as the ideological difference approaches 10 or -10, the probability of the party aiming its manifesto at that particular voter diminishes. Through this measurement, we posit that as the ideological difference between voters and political parties is minimized (closer to 0), parties are more inclined to represent those voters in their policy platforms.

Our primary independent variables include respondents' *dislike-like scores for political parties*, ranging from 0 ("strongly dislike") to 10 ("strongly like"), used to evaluate both core and swing supporters, along with socio-economic attributes measured for supporters with resources. These attributes include *educational attainment*[12], *age*, *religion*[13], *gender*[14], and *income levels*. In supplementary alternate tests, we incorporate additional control variables, such as fixed effects for years and individuals' party affiliations.

6   Results

From the text analysis of party platforms, we find that Korean political parties have changed their ideological positions across elections. Figure 1 presents the estimated left-right positions of major parties based on their National Assembly manifestos from 1992 to 2016. These are shown by election year (Figure 1a) and by party family (Figure 1b). A higher estimated parameter (theta) indicates a more conservative position. The results of text analysis on Korean party manifestos reveal that political parties have adjusted their programmatic stances to achieve their goals over time. These findings support the view that parties in newer and transitional democracies adapt their left-right positions in alignment with voters' demands over time (H1).

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[12]The variable for individuals' highest educational attainment is categorized into no education, elementary school, middle or high school, college, and university degree.

[13]In the CSES data, there are no questions that inquire about the frequency of respondents' attendance at churches, temples, or mosques, which could be used to assess their level of religiosity. Consequently, this study relies on categorizing respondents by their religious affiliation. The religion variable is dichotomously coded as 1 for respondents identifying as Protestant and 0 otherwise.

[14]The gender variable is dichotomously coded as 1 for female respondents and 0 otherwise.

Figure 1: Korean Parties' Ideological Positions in Manifestos (1992–2016)

(a) Ideological Positions by Elections
(b) Ideological Positions by Party Families

Note: Figure 1a displays the estimated left-right ideological positions of Korean political parties across seven National Assembly elections (1992–2016), based on text analysis of party manifestos. Figure 1b presents the same positions grouped by party family—Democratic, Chungcheong, Conservative, Third, and Progressive. Confidence intervals are shown at the 95% level.

In Figure 1a, we observe that most parties cluster near the ideological center in the early 1990s. As elections progress, particularly from the 17th election (2004) onward, parties spread out more across the left-right spectrum, indicating increasing ideological differentiation. The Grand National Party maintains a relatively stable conservative stance throughout, while progressive parties, such as Minju Nodong Dang and the United Progressive Party, emerge farther to the left in later elections. This dispersion suggests that parties are beginning to emphasize more distinct programmatic profiles, supporting Hypothesis 1.

Figure 1b shows how ideological shifts have played out within each party family. The Democratic family clearly moves leftward over time, reflecting a growing emphasis on welfare and in-

clusive policies. The Conservative family, while still right-leaning, exhibits a modest shift toward the center in more recent elections. The Progressive family maintains strong leftist positions across elections. The Third and Chungcheong families show more fluctuation and less consistency, indicating weaker ideological coherence. These differences across families further highlight the potential for programmatic differentiation and institutionalization over time.

Second, an important pattern emerges: political parties maintained their most conservative stances during the early elections immediately following democratization in 1987, as previous studies have also argued (Choi, 2002) and gradually shifted toward more liberal positions in subsequent elections. The text analysis results reveal a predominantly right-leaning party system during the early elections (the 14th and 15th, 1992 and 1996) and a left-leaning party system in more recent elections. Significant variation in the left-right positions is also observed within the same party families across elections. The consistent leftward ideological shift within these families suggests two contrasting narratives about the Korean party system: conservatism is no longer the sole dominant ideology, and political parties can now be distinguished based on their programmatic stances across elections and party families.

We now turn to estimating the parameters of Equation 1 to examine which demographic or ideological groups among supporters political parties are more responsive to in their manifestos (H2 and H3). Figure 2 displays the distribution of our dependent variable, the *Ideological Difference between Parties and Supporters*. The x-axis indicates the extent of ideological difference or proximity, while the y-axis reflects the number of survey respondents. Two key trends emerge. First, there is a decreasing distinction between the ideologies of political parties and their supporters over time. Second, in 2000, 2004, and 2008, political parties appear to be more conservative than their supporters, whereas by 2012, parties lean more liberal. This narrowing ideological gap suggests increasing responsiveness by Korean political parties to the evolving preferences of their supporter base.

Figure 2: Ideological Difference between Voters and Political Parties

Note: Figure 2 presents histograms of the ideological distance between Korean political parties and their supporters in the 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 elections. The x-axis measures the degree of ideological difference (closer to zero indicates greater alignment), and the y-axis indicates the number of respondents.

A closer look at Figure 2 reveals that in 2000 and 2004, the distribution is left-skewed, showing that parties were generally more conservative than their supporters. In 2008, the pattern persists but is less pronounced. By 2012, the distribution shifts to the right of zero, indicating that parties have become more liberal than their supporters. In addition, we observe that the width of the distributions decreases over time—suggesting not only a directional shift but also a tightening alignment between party platforms and supporter ideologies. This pattern supports the claim that Korean parties have become more responsive to public preferences, particularly in the most recent election periods.

Table 1 presents OLS regression results predicting the ideological gap between parties and their supporters to test the core supporter hypothesis (H2) and the resource-based representation hypothesis (H3). Model 1 includes a parsimonious set of predictors: party like-dislike scores, age,

Table 1: Regression Results for Ideological Difference

	Dependent Variable: Ideological Difference				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Dislike-like Score	−0.04	−0.09**	−0.15***	−0.14***	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.10)
Age	−0.08***	−0.04***	−0.03***	−0.04***	−0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Elementary School	0.94***	0.34	0.27	0.15	0.25
	(0.30)	(0.23)	(0.19)	(0.24)	(0.19)
Middle/High School	−1.34***	−0.18	−0.13	−0.10	−0.15
	(0.21)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.13)
College	−4.19***	−0.04	−0.35	3.12	−0.43
	(0.45)	(0.36)	(0.30)	(2.33)	(0.30)
University	1.75*	1.24*	0.81	0.43	0.84
	(0.92)	(0.70)	(0.58)	(0.66)	(0.57)
Protestant	0.51**	0.44***	0.30**	0.34*	0.30**
	(0.22)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.13)
Female	−0.10	0.09	0.14	0.31**	0.13
	(0.19)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.11)
Income				−0.02	
				(0.09)	
Constant	5.88***	6.84***	8.09***	7.94***	6.50***
	(0.49)	(0.39)	(0.41)	(0.54)	(0.87)
Observations	1,570	1,570	1,570	1,023	1,570
R^2	0.13	0.50	0.67	0.45	0.68
Adjusted R^2	0.12	0.50	0.66	0.44	0.67
Residual Std. Error	3.63	2.74	2.25	2.31	2.21
F Statistic	28.09***	142.27***	154.02***	48.55***	113.15***

Note: Significance level *, **, and *** indicate zero is not covered by the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence interval, respectively. Model 1 includes a parsimonious set of predictors: party like-dislike scores, age, education, religion, and gender. Model 2 adds fixed effects for years. Model 3 further adds party identification dummies. Model 4 includes an income variable. Model 5 incorporates interaction terms between dislike-like scores and party identification. The full model results including year and party fixed effects and interaction terms are presented in the Appendix (Table 3).

education, religion, and gender. Model 2 adds year dummies to account for temporal variation. Model 3 further includes party identification dummies, while Model 4 adds income. Model 5 incorporates interaction terms between party identification and Dislike-like scores to assess heterogeneous responsiveness by party.

The results show that ideological closeness and favorable attitudes (like scores) are consistently associated with smaller ideological gaps, except in Model 1. This supports Hypothesis 2, suggesting that Korean political parties are more responsive to their core supporters—those who are ideologically proximate and have positive feelings toward the party—than to swing voters. This finding implies that Korean parties have drafted and revised their policies to target supporters as programmatically institutionalized.

Regarding Hypothesis 3, which posits that political parties are more likely to represent those who are older, more educated, wealthier, male, and religious, the results are mixed. The regressions consistently show that parties are more likely to respond to supporters who are older, male, more educated, and non-Protestant. Specifically, as supporters' age increases, the ideological difference between them and their parties decreases. In terms of religion, non-Protestants are more likely to be represented than Protestants. Only Model 1 shows a statistically significant relationship for education, indicating that college-educated individuals are more likely to be targeted than those with less education. Model 4 reveals that male supporters are more likely to be targeted than female supporters. However, income does not emerge as a statistically significant factor in any model.

7   Conclusion

This study revisits a central question in the study of political parties in new democracies: can parties evolve beyond clientelism and weak institutionalization to become programmatic actors, or do they remain persistently underdeveloped? By analyzing South Korea's party system and party manifestos over time, we show that party-level institutionalization—especially in its programmatic dimension—can and does occur, even in contexts historically marked by elite volatility, weak social linkages, and the absence of strong linkage between political parties and voters.

The findings challenge the conventional wisdom that parties in newer democracies lack the capacity or incentive to engage voters programmatically. South Korean parties have exhibited both ideological adaptation—shifting their positions over time—and targeted representation of core supporters. Rather than adhering to static ideological legacies or broadly appealing to a median voter, parties strategically adjust their platforms to maintain coherence with electorally valuable constituencies, particularly those who are ideologically proximate and politically engaged.

This behavior suggests that programmatic institutionalization in new democracies may emerge not through sweeping systemic reforms, but through more incremental shifts in party strategy. The evidence from South Korea shows that parties in newer and transitional democracies are capable of developing clearer policy profiles and aligning with specific segments of the electorate. Such selective responsiveness represents a meaningful departure from traditional views of parties as purely clientelistic or unstable actors in transitional settings.

By focusing on party-level rather than system-level dynamics, this study adds a critical layer to the party institutionalization literature. It shows that party responsiveness is not only possible but also structured and strategic. The analysis also offers a framework for evaluating programmatic development that accounts for ideological adaptation and voter targeting—two dimensions often overlooked in discussions of party system institutionalization.

Future research can build on these insights by examining whether similar patterns hold in other newer democracies. Comparative studies might explore how electoral institutions, historical legacies, or civil society structures shape the conditions under which programmatic institutionalization emerges. Additionally, further attention to subconstituency targeting and the evolution of manifesto content could illuminate how parties manage the balance between ideological coherence and electoral competitiveness.

In sum, this study demonstrates that parties in newer democracies are not necessarily trapped in underdevelopment. Under certain conditions—such as increased electoral competition, changing voter expectations, and the presence of politically engaged core supporters—parties can become programmatic actors. By strategically adapting their ideological profiles and selectively targeting

key constituencies, they can forge more coherent and consistent patterns of representation over time. This evolution may be uneven and contingent, but it nonetheless signals the potential for party development even in transitional settings. These findings encourage scholars to take seriously the possibility that party institutionalization can emerge from within the electoral strategies of individual parties, offering a more dynamic and grounded understanding of how representative democracy functions in newer democracies.

8 Appendix

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Ideological Difference	1,775	1.7	3.8	−10.0	−0.8	4.6	10.0
Dislike-like Score	2,104	7.5	2.0	0.0	6.0	9.0	10.0
Age	2,143	44.2	14.2	19	33	54	91
Protestant	1,944	0.2	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
Female	2,143	0.5	0.5	0	0	1	1
Income	1,360	2.7	0.9	1.0	2.0	3.0	5.0
Survey Year	2,143	2006.6	4.2	2000	2004	2012	2012

Table 3: Regression Results for Ideological Difference

	Dependent Variable: Ideological Difference				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Dislike-like Score	−0.04	−0.09**	−0.15***	−0.14***	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.10)
Age	−0.08***	−0.04***	−0.03***	−0.04***	−0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Elementary School	0.94***	0.34	0.27	0.15	0.25
	(0.30)	(0.23)	(0.19)	(0.24)	(0.19)
Middle/High School	−1.34***	−0.18	−0.13	−0.10	−0.15

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	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
			Dependent Variable: Ideological Difference (continued)		
	(0.21)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.13)
College	−4.19***	−0.04	−0.35	3.12	−0.43
	(0.45)	(0.36)	(0.30)	(2.33)	(0.30)
University	1.75*	1.24*	0.81	0.43	0.84
	(0.92)	(0.70)	(0.58)	(0.66)	(0.57)
Protestant	0.51**	0.44***	0.30**	0.34*	0.30**
	(0.22)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.13)
Female	−0.10	0.09	0.14	0.31**	0.13
	(0.19)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.11)
Income				−0.02	
				(0.09)	
Year 2004			−1.09***	−2.96***	−2.90***	−2.96***
			(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.22)
Year 2008			−3.12***	−2.74***	−2.77***	−2.69***
			(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.23)
Year 2012			−6.76***	−4.72***		−6.18***
			(0.23)	(1.16)		(1.28)
Dislike-like Score*Party ID: DP						0.09
						(0.13)
Dislike-like Score*Party ID: DUP						−0.27
						(0.17)
Dislike-like Score*Party ID: GNP						−0.36***
						(0.11)
Dislike-like Score*Party ID: LFP						−0.71***

	Dependent Variable: Ideological Difference (continued)				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
					(0.22)
Dislike-like Score*Party ID: MDP					−0.04
					(0.13)
Dislike-like Score*Party ID: NFP					−0.61***
					(0.13)
Dislike-like Score*Party ID: PPA					−0.37
					(0.24)
Dislike-like Score*Party ID: UPP					0.31
					(0.22)
Dislike-like Score*Party ID: Uri					−0.02
					(0.13)
Dislike-like Score*Party ID: DP			−5.11***		−4.08**
			(1.17)		(1.62)
Dislike-like Score*Party ID: DUP			−0.84**	−0.64	1.19
			(0.40)	(0.45)	(1.36)
Dislike-like Score*Party ID: GNP			−1.62***	−1.56***	1.12
			(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.92)
Dislike-like Score*Party ID: LFP			−1.12**	−0.96	4.31**
			(0.56)	(0.59)	(1.78)
Dislike-like Score*Party ID: MDP			−0.38	−0.28	−0.02
			(0.32)	(0.35)	(1.07)
Dislike-like Score*Party ID: NFP			−1.60		4.64***
			(1.17)		(1.66)
Dislike-like Score*Party ID: PPA			−2.05***	−1.97***	0.81

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	Dependent Variable: Ideological Difference (continued)				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
			(0.48)	(0.52)	(1.96)
Dislike-like Score*Party ID: UPP			-1.14		-1.89
			(1.22)		(2.15)
Dislike-like Score*Party ID: Uri			3.15^{***}	3.10^{***}	3.40^{***}
			(0.26)	(0.29)	(1.02)
Constant	5.88^{***}	6.84^{***}	8.09^{***}	7.94^{***}	6.50^{***}
	(0.49)	(0.39)	(0.41)	(0.54)	(0.87)
Observations	1,570	1,570	1,570	1,023	1,570
R^2	0.13	0.50	0.67	0.45	0.68
Adjusted R^2	0.12	0.50	0.66	0.44	0.67
Residual Std. Error	3.63	2.74	2.25	2.31	2.21
F Statistic	28.09^{***}	142.27^{***}	154.02^{***}	48.55^{***}	113.15^{***}

Note: Significance level *, **, and *** indicate zero is not covered by the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence interval, respectively. Model 1 includes a parsimonious set of predictors: party like-dislike scores, age, education, religion, and gender. Model 2 adds fixed effects for years. Model 3 further adds party identification dummies. Model 4 includes an income variable. Model 5 incorporates interaction terms between dislike-like scores and party identification.

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